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The purpose of this paper is to test the main hypotheses of the recent theoretical literature
on the political economy of reform for the case of the Latin American countries between
1985 and 1995. The paper first reviews the literature and extracts the main testable
hypotheses. Then, a system of indices that measure the extent of reform in five policy areas
is presented. These indices are used as the dependent variables in panel regressions where
the main explanatory variables are indicators of crisis, political variables and indicators of
channels of contagion. We find very strong support for the well-known hypothesis that
crises make reform viable and also for the (less theoretically sound) hypotheses that reforms
are more likely at the beginning of government periods. None of the hypotheses on the role
of political and distributional variables, the importance of compensation schemes or
contagion, finds support in our results. Rather disappointingly, however, most of the reforms
seem to have responded to a process of convergence.
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I. Introduction
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s Latin America experienced a
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profound economic revolution as import restrictions were lifted, financial
markets liberalized and numerous state enterprises privatized. The economic
effects of these types of structural reforms are widely thought to be positive,
and a growing body of empirical literature for Latin America gives support to
that belief (see, in particular, Fernández-Arias and Montiel, 1997; Easterly,
Loayza and Montiel, 1997; and Lora and Barrera, 1997).
The wave of structural reforms in Latin America and elsewhere has also
stimulated the development of a wide body of theoretical literature on the
political economy of reform, i.e., the study of the political constraints that
condition the timing, speed and sequencing of reforms. The leitmotif of this
literature is the recognition that what is efficient in economic terms may not
be politically viable, and that less than optimal policies may be maintained or
adopted not as a result of shortsightedness or ignorance, but due to some
form of political constraint (two useful surveys are Rodrik, 1996, and Tommasi
and Velasco, 1996).
This literature has consisted mainly of case studies and theoretical models
that defy systematic empirical testing. The main reason for this is the difficulty
of defining, let alone measuring, the progress of structural reform.1 The
purpose of this paper is to test some of the hypotheses associated with these
theoretical models, using a set of structural reform indicators recently compiled
by Lora (1997) for about 20 Latin American countries for the period 1985-
1995. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II identifies the
main hypotheses that can be subjected to empirical scrutiny; section III
organizes these hypotheses under several headings; section IV describes the
data and sources; section V discusses the econometric results, and section VI
offers the somewhat disappointing conclusion that, although we find very
strong support for some of the theoretical hypotheses, much of the wave of
recent reforms in Latin America cannot be explained without either better
theories or better data. The result of the paper, therefore, is to show the chasm
between the richness and sophistication of the theories, on the one hand, and
the paucity of the data and empirical analyses, on the other.
1 In contrast, a vast empirical literature has developed around the political economy of
macroeconomic reform, especially in developed countries. For a review see Alesina (1994).101 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
II. What Makes Reform Likely
A vast number of models have been developed to explain what makes
reforms likely and what determines their timing, speed and sequence. This
paper concentrates largely on the first of these issues, although all are closely
related. The purpose of this section is not to provide a survey of the theories
of the political economy of reform, but only to identify those theories that
lend themselves to empirical testing.2
The issue of timing arises because policies that are known to be grossly
inefficient, such as trade restrictions or highly distortive tax systems, are kept
in place for long periods in most countries, while more efficient policies are
resisted. Explanations based on some form of irrationality (such as ignorance,
shortsightedness or ideology) do not explain why reforms take place at a
certain time and not before or after (although irrationality may be part of the
story, as we will see below). The main building block of the theories that
have been put forward to explain the timing of reforms is the distributional
conflicts that are often aroused by (the prospect of) reform. The outcome of
these conflicts is influenced by, among other factors: (a) exogenous changes
(crisis), (b) the mix of policy changes proposed to the conflicting parties
(compensation), (c) how uncertainty evolves as experience accumulates
(contagion), and (d) the order in which the reforms will be implemented
(sequencing).
A. Distribution of Costs and Benefits
The seminal work on this issue is Alesina and Drazen (1991), who have
hypothesized that the more unequal the distribution of the costs of reform,
and the more polarized the society is, the longer it takes to be adopted (see
also Alesina, 1994). Their argument, which was originally developed to explain
why stabilizations are delayed, is that the political conflict among
heterogeneous groups over how the burden of the stabilization will be allocated
leads to rational delays. In this situation, one of the groups concedes only
2 Excellent surveys are Rodrik (1996) and Tommasi and Velasco (1996). A compact summary
of the latter is provided in IDB (1997), Part 2, Boxes 1.1 to 1.3.102 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
when it realizes that the cost of waiting exceeds that of the reform. For this
war of attrition to take place, information must be distributed asymmetrically
(each group must know with certainty only its own costs), and stabilization
costs must be distributed unequally.
Alesina and Drazen’s model suggests that, other things being equal, reforms
are adopted later in countries with more political fragmentation, where small
groups can use their veto power to block reform legislation. Fragmented party
systems are usually considered to be a hurdle for reforms, or at least an
important factor in shaping them. “Fragmentation makes coalition rule more
likely, increases the difficulty of making compromises and contributes to the
instability of governments–all factors that can affect government policy”
(Haggard and Webb, 1994; see also Roubini and Sachs, 1989).
The war of attrition model also implies that reforms that are delayed are
those for which the costs have to be allocated in the political debate (typically
tax reforms), and reforms that imply changes of entitlements (labor, social
security), and even privatizations.  Reforms not subject to delay, on the other
hand, are those for which the distributional effects are less dependent on the
political debate (typically financial reform or, arguably, trade liberalization).
Note that the existing income distribution, or the distributional effects of the
reforms, is not the relevant issue. What is relevant is the conflict over the
distribution of the burden.
Rodrik (1994) has taken a different approach to explain the role of
distributional conflict in the timing of reforms. In his view, the political cost
of a reform is associated with the amount of income redistributed among
different groups, while the benefit comes from the efficiency gains it produces.
The ratio between costs and benefits reflects the degree of political inefficiency
of the reform. Trade reform is politically inefficient because large amounts of
income need to be reshuffled among different groups in the economy to obtain
a modest efficiency gain (he suggests a ratio of around 5 to 1). Thus, trade
liberalization tends to be pursued gradually, unless tied to other reforms that
entail substantial efficiency gains and reduce the political cost-benefit ratio,
as we will discuss below.
In democratic societies, uncertainty about the distribution of costs at the
individual level may also be an obstacle to reforms that would benefit a
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vote in favor of the reform and it would be adopted. But if the identity of
some of the losers were undefined, eventual winners would vote against it
just to be safe, thereby blocking its adoption (Fernández and Rodrik, 1991).
The implication that can be drawn from all of these theories, as we discuss
below, is that reforms occur during periods of crisis and are facilitated by
certain compensation schemes.
B. Crisis
As Drazen and Grilli (1993) have demonstrated, the war of attrition models
can be extended to show that exogenous shocks that aggravate economic
conditions increase the cost of not adopting reforms and thus prompt a solution
to the war. It follows from this type of model that the particular characteristics
of each crisis may facilitate some reforms more than others. For instance,
trade liberalization tends to occur during periods of severe collapse of domestic
demand, which disproportionately affects the import substituting industries
that usually oppose liberalization. Similarly, liberalization of the domestic
financial market is facilitated by outbursts of inflation that undermine
subsidized credit systems and may reduce the inflation tax revenue partly
captured by the banks.
From the discussion of Rodrik’s (1994) political cost-benefit ratio, it
follows that a specific reform that is unpalatable by itself may be politically
acceptable if packaged with other reforms that have lower cost-benefit ratios.
Macroeconomic stabilization is such a reform: “Unlike trade liberalization, it
holds the promise of generating benefits that will be shared by all.... Moreover,
the deeper the crisis, the larger the overall net benefits from recovery” (Rodrik,
1994, p. 80). Thus trade and other structural reforms should be expected to
occur in periods of crisis, bundled with macroeconomic reforms.
C. Compensation Schemes
It also follows from the previous theories that to make reform politically
feasible in a democratic setting, it is often necessary to devise compensation
schemes to ensure that a majority is better off (or at least no worse off). However,
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compensation for losing groups, but rather those that include complementary
policies to offset the costs associated with reform and have other benefits
(Haggard and Webb, 1994, chapter 1). The reason for this is that direct
compensation schemes, in the presence of individual uncertainty, may not be
credible, since those who fear being hurt know that if reform is passed, a
majority will favor its continuation with or without compensation (Fernández
and Rodrik, 1991). In the case of trade reform, such an indirect complementary
policy may be an exchange rate devaluation, which protects the import-
competing sector from external competition and enhances export
competitiveness (Rodrik, 1994). Table 1 presents other cases of indirect
complementary policies that benefit the potential losers in each area of reform
and may be desirable for other reasons, in particular on economic efficiency
grounds. The table also includes a tentative list of the macroeconomic
circumstances that may weaken the opposition to reform, prompting a solution
to the war of attrition.
D. Contagion
A number of models have been put forward to explore the role of
uncertainty in the timing of reforms. As we shall see, most of them may be
extended into theories of contagion. As already mentioned, Fernández and
Rodrik (1991) have shown that uncertainty about which individuals will lose
as a result of reform produces a bias toward maintaining an inefficient status
quo and against reform that would benefit the majority.
Milesi-Ferretti (1991) shows that reform may also be delayed if the
government is uncertain about its own competence to pursue it at low cost. If
the reform is implemented and the government is discovered to be incompetent,
the public may choose to elect the opposition. On the other hand, if the
government does not attempt the reform, nothing is learned about its
incompetence. As Alesina (1994) points out, “This model is particularly
relevant for cases in which a policy reform is relatively new.” Both the
Fernández and Rodrik and the Milesi-Ferretti models clearly suggest that
previous experiences may facilitate reform by reducing individuals’ uncertainty
about the distribution of benefits and costs and government’s uncertainty about
its ability to implement a certain reform. A more direct treatment of the role of
the learning process in the timing of reforms is provided by Perktold and105 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
Table 1. Major Opponents to Reform and Possible Indirect Compensation
Major Debilitating Possible
opponents factors compensation
Trade reform Import-competing Domestic demand Devaluation; trade
firms (and recession agreements
their workers)
Domestic Big firms, targeted High inflation; Reduce marginal
financial reform credit users and reduced inflation income tax rates;
large (especially tax better access to
state-owned) banks external credit
Tax reform Medium to large Recession; fall in Better access to
firms, middle-class real wages; credit and imported
workers unemployment goods
Privatization Workers of Fiscal deficits; Access to
state-owned firms falling wages ownership and
credit




Tommasi (1994), cited by Tommasi and Velasco (1996). In their view, the choice
of economic policies is the result of how much Bayesian learning has taken
place about the correct model of the world. Bad policies can remain in place
for some time, but there is a gradual and cumulative spillover effect from the
policy choices and outcomes of other countries. “The experience of many
reforming countries (assuming a modicum of success) will hopefully be
imitated by others before having to themselves experience a crisis” (Tommasi
and Velasco, 1995, p. 18).106 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
E. Sequencing3
The early literature on the sequencing of reforms, which was of a normative
nature, concentrated on the order of liberalization of the trade and capital
accounts, with some extensions to financial liberalization. In the recent
literature on the political economy of reform, the question of order is notoriously
absent. What is discussed is the degree of bundling or unbundling of a (loosely
defined) set of reforms. If the reforms are complementary, unbundling is a more
likely result on political economy grounds. As formally developed by
Dewatripont and Roland (1995), the reason is that, at each stage in the process,
people are more willing to accept less popular reforms so as not to lose the gains
from previous reforms. For this proposition to be testable it is necessary to prove
that the reforms are complementary, in the sense that each additional reform
increases the payoff of those already undertaken. A related argument developed
by Wei (1992) shows that unbundling is a divide-and-conquer strategy: a
package of reforms that would have been rejected by majority voting may gain
approval if submitted piecemeal, because a growing constituency may develop
in those (also growing) sectors favored by the previous reforms. On the other
side of the debate, Martinelli and Tommasi (1997) argue that in societies with
powerful interest groups, unbundling is time inconsistent: winners of early
reforms, who are hurt by later reforms, would have an incentive to derail the
process. Knowing that, losers from early reforms will oppose the earlier
measures. Only a complete bundling may cut through this Gordian knot. As
suggested by Tommasi and Velasco (1996), these models imply a testable
proposition: bundling is more likely to occur in countries with deeply ingrained
distributive conflicts and powerful interest groups, while unbundling is more
likely in countries where the majority rule applies.
F. Other Factors
As we have seen, the theoretical literature on the political economy of
reform sheds light on a number of (observable) factors that may influence the
3 This subsection draws on IDB (1997), Part 2, Box 1.2.107 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
timing and mix of reforms. Rather surprisingly, however, that literature offers
little explanation of the apparent importance of some factors (and facts) that
seem to the average citizen to be the simplest reasons for reform: changes of
government, international influences (apart from contagion) and capacity of
the state. Based on case studies, Haggard and Webb (1994, p. 8) have pointed
out that the window of opportunity that opens during periods of crisis can be
better exploited by newly elected governments, which “typically enjoy a period
in which the costs of adjustment can be traded against political gains” (see
also Haggard and Webb, 1993). They have also found that international factors
influence the reform process through a number of channels, such as the
prospect of trade concessions and agreements, conditionality and ideas (which
stem from external advisers, technocrats trained abroad, etc.). We may add to
this list of foreign influences the availability of external finance. Haggard
and Webb (1993, p. 151), drawing on Callaghy (1989), also point out that
“the prospects for policy reform also depend on characteristics of the state
itself, particularly the discipline and competence of the bureaucracy.” Although
most of these hypotheses are in need of a structured theoretical foundation,
we find them worth testing.
III. Hypotheses
We can now summarize the main testable hypotheses that stem from the
theoretical literature (and the main authors associated with them) under five
headings:
- The role of crisis: (a) crisis accelerates reform (Alesina and Drazen,
1991; Drazen and Grilli, 1993); (b) the characteristics of the crisis affect the
composition of reform; in particular, growth deceleration may facilitate trade
and tax reforms, high inflation may lead to financial reform, fiscal deficits to
tax reform and privatization (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli,
1993).4
- Political variables: (a) reform is adopted later in countries with more
4 An additional testable hypothesis is that increasing unemployment facilitates tax reforms,
privatization and labor reforms. However, it will not be tested here due to lack of comparable
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political fragmentation (Alesina and Drazen, 1991); (b) reforms for which
the distributional effects are more subject to political debate (tax, labor and
pension reforms as opposed to financial or trade reforms) are adopted later
(Alesina and Drazen, 1991); (c) reform is more likely at the beginning of new
government periods (Haggard and Webb, 1994); (d) reform is more likely in
countries with more efficient state apparatus (Callaghy, 1989).
- Compensation: (a) devaluation facilitates the adoption of trade reform
(Rodrik, 1994); (b) trade reform is facilitated by the prospect of trade
concessions (Haggard and Webb, 1994); (c) reforms with higher cost-benefit
political ratios (trade) tend to be bundled with others with lower ratios
(stabilization and maybe financial) (Rodrik, 1994); (d) bundling is likely if
one reform offers (indirect) compensation to the losers of other reforms
(Fernández and Rodrik, 1991; Haggard and Webb, 1994). In particular,
financial reform may be bundled with tax reform and the latter with trade
reform (see Table 1).
- Contagion and other external factors: (a) international contagion
accelerates reform (Perktold and Tommasi, 1994); (b) external financing
facilitates reform.5
- Bundling: (a) if reforms are complementary (a hypothesis in itself), they
are likely to be unbundled (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995); (b) structural
reform is expected to be bundled with stabilization (Rodrik, 1994); (c) bundling
is more likely to occur in countries with deeply ingrained distributive conflicts
and powerful interest groups, while unbundling is more likely in countries
where majority rule applies (Martinelli and Tommasi, 1997; Tommasi and
Velasco, 1996).
IV. Data
We now describe the data that make these hypotheses testable. A complete
list of data sources (including those of the usual economic variables) is
presented in the Appendix (Table A.1.).
5 Better access to external financing is also a compensation device in the case of domestic
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A. Structural Reform
The first step in testing our hypotheses is to define and measure structural
reform. In Lora (1997), we proposed an index of structural policies that seeks
to reflect the degree of neutrality of economic policies in five areas: (i) trade
policy, (ii) tax policy, (iii) financial policy, (iv) privatization, and (v) labor
legislation. In each area, several policy variables are considered (see Table
2). Each policy variable is rescaled so that the worst observation for the entire
Table 2. Components of Total Structural Policy Index
Policy variable                                    Indicators
Trade policy The two indicators used in this area are: (i) average tariffs
(including surcharges) and (ii) tariff dispersion. For lack
of information, the index does not consider, as would be
desirable, the restrictions placed on international trade
through permits and quotas.
Tax policy This   area  combines  the  following  policy  indicators:
(i) maximum marginal income tax rate on corporations,
(ii)  maximum marginal income tax rate on individuals,
(iii) basic value-added tax rate, and, for countries on which
information is available, (iv) productivity of value-added
tax (defined as the ratio between the basic rate and actual
collection expressed as a percentage of GDP).  We have
chosen the maximum instead of the average marginal tax
rates because the former are those that influence labor and
investment decisions. We take into account the productivity
rate of the VAT because that indicates how far the real
indirect taxation system deviates from the principle of
neutrality among economic activities.
Financial policy This area combines four indicators: (i) freedom of interest
rates  on  deposits (on a discrete scale going from 0 to 2),
(ii) freedom of interest rates on loans (idem), (iii) real level110 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 2. (Continued) Components of Total Structural Policy Index
Policy variable                                    Indicators
of reserves of bank deposits, and (iv) quality of banking and
finance oversight (on a discrete and subjective scale, from
0 to 2).
Privatization In this area the only indicator used is the effort at
privatization measured as the sums accumulated from
privatization since 1988, including sales and other property
transfers, as a proportion of average public investment
between 1985 and 1987. We take the cumulative
privatization and not the flow, because we are interested in
measuring how great is the field opened to private
enterprise, just as, for example in the tariff areas it is the
levels that are taken, not the changes. The ideal measure
would be the percentage of a country’s physical assets that
are owned and operated by the private sector, but that
information is not available.  Hence we take privatizations
in relation to public investment in previous years, since
presumably this variable is related to the capital stock held
by the public sector when the process began.
Labor legislation In this area the flexibility of legislation is considered in
five respects, each of which is qualified with objective
criteria on a discrete 0 to 2 scale: (i) hiring, (ii) costs of
dismissal after one year of work, (iii) costs of dismissal
after ten years of work, (iv) overtime pay, and (v) social
security contributions.
panel sample (for countries and year periods) takes the value of 0 and the best
takes the value of 1. An index is then constructed for each of the five areas
(as a simple average of the relevant policy variables). Finally, a total index is
obtained as the simple average of the indices of the five areas.111 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
The index attempts to capture the neutrality of policies under the
assumption that the primary objective of structural reform in Latin America
has been to improve efficiency and not to redistribute income, protect
vulnerable groups or raise public revenues, to name just a few alternative
policy objectives. For an average of 19 Latin American countries, the total
index shows steady improvement, from 0.35 in 1985 to 0.60 ten years later.
The most outstanding advances have been in the areas of trade and financial
reform (the corresponding indices approach average values of 0.9 and 0.8,
respectively). Progress has been much more limited in other areas. The index
of tax policy rose only from 0.40 to 0.58, despite many tax reforms in most
countries. The average index of privatization reached an average level of
only 0.26, with very large differences among countries. Finally, the index of
labor legislation remained practically unchanged at around 0.6. Although all
the countries in our sample show increases in their total policy indices, the
time and pace of the reforms vary significantly from country to country.
Table 3 contains information by country on the initial and final values of
the indices for the period 1985-95 and some macroeconomic outcomes before
and after the period of main reform in each country.6 Bolivia and Peru have
the highest policy indices in 1995, and Venezuela and Costa Rica the lowest.
The deepest reformers (i.e., those with the biggest changes in the policy
indices) are Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Argentina. The median country
shows an improvement of 1.3% in its rate of GDP growth in the three-year
post-reform period, a reduction of roughly 9 points in the inflation rate and a
fiscal improvement of nearly 2% of GDP.
B. Indicators of Crisis
Growth crisis indicators used in the index are: (i) the gap between real
income per capita at the beginning of the period and its previous maximum
level (since 1970), and (ii) growth in the years of recession (i.e., the negative
observations of that variable). The correlation of our two growth crisis
indicators is weak (-0.29, using all observations). Inflation crisis indicators
6 For purposes of this table, the period of main reform is defined as the two-year period































Table 3. Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Performance
Total Fiscal deficit
structural index (% of GDP)
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-    Pre-     Post-
reform reform reform reform    reform    reform
Argentina 0.367 0.679 1988-90 -1.56 -0.39 -1.84 7.86   1,186.09 69.06
Bolivia 0.343 0.721 1993-95 -2.43 3.51 9.50
Brazil 0.348 0.584 1987-89 -13.53 -3.40 3.65 -1.66 349.44 1,462.41
Chile 0.489 0.628 1984-86 -2.29 0.68 1.98 7.93 30.70 17.20
Colombia 0.443 0.590 1990-92 1.53 -0.50 3.22 5.39 28.46 22.48
Costa Rica 0.309 0.512 1986-88 -2.88 -2.20 3.68 3.82 14.58 21.42
Dominican Rep. 0.361 0.638 1989-91 0.22 0.87 0.37 5.12 49.76 6.03
Ecuador 0.325 0.580 1990-92 1.73 0.37 2.77 2.91 57.62 31.74
El Salvador 0.386 0.671 1988-90 -0.85 -2.59 1.79 6.16 20.75 14.74
Guatemala 0.309 0.596 1989-91 -1.92 -0.78 3.65 4.25 21.15 10.91
Honduras 0.402 0.548 1990-92 -2.00 0.70 2.56 2.80 22.39 20.65
Jamaica 0.426 0.684 1985-87 -2.87 -0.07 -1.50 5.05 20.39 14.85
Countries
 GDP growth (%)      Inflation (%)






























Table 3. (Continued) Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Performance
Mexico 0.328 0.563 1989-91 -5.86 0.37 3.03 2.63 53.61 10.72
Nicaragua 0.216 0.643 1991-93 -40.70 -2.72 0.08 3.76 3,415.91 9.39
Paraguay 0.336 0.625 1988-90 1.02 0.60 5.50 2.79 23.61 19.22
Peru 0.232 0.712 1989-91 -4.38 0.05 -8.47 6.02 3,837.52 48.62
Trinidad & Tobago 0.425 0.715 1988-90 -5.14 -1.40 -3.12 -0.13 9.95 7.01
Uruguay 0.486 0.577 1991-93 0.63 -2.11 3.99 2.16 94.32 43.50
Venezuela 0.304 0.457 1987-89 -3.78 0.54 5.67 7.56 23.05 35.43
Averagea 0.360 0.617   1988-91 b -4.59 -0.66 1.50 4.14 514.41 103.63
Mediana 0.348 0.625 -2.14 -0.23 2.66 4.04 29.58 19.94
Stand. dev.a 0.072 0.069 9.41 1.35 3.38 2.52 1,134.89 329.94
Notes: a Does not include Bolivia for macroeconomic performance variables; b During these years, 8 countries undertook their major reforms.
Total Fiscal deficit
structural index (% of GDP)
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-    Pre-     Post-
reform reform reform reform    reform    reform
Countries
 GDP growth (%)      Inflation (%)
1985           1995
Years of
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are: (i) the log of inflation when it is higher than 30%, (ii) the inflation tax
(defined as log (1+B) * M1/GDP, where B is average inflation, from monthly
data) and (iii) the volatility of inflation (measured as the standard deviation in
each year of the monthly variations in the CPI). The correlation of our first
and third inflation crisis indicators is strong (0.80). The inflation tax is less
correlated with the other two indicators (0.42 and 0.36, respectively). Fiscal
crisis is defined as the consolidated public sector balance for those years
when there are deficits larger than 3% of GDP.
C. Political Variables
The next step toward applying the hypotheses concerns the definition of
political and distributional variables. We use two alternative measures of
political fragmentation. One is the effective number of parties in the lower
(or single) house of the Congress (weighted by the number of representatives
in that house); the other is governing party representation, i.e., the percentage
of legislative seats held by the head of government’s party in the Congress
(the former come from IDB 1997, Part 3; the latter from Inter-Parliamentary
Union 1985 to 1996). Electoral years (also from IPU 1985) are used to define
presidential term years. The only pair strongly correlated is political
fragmentation and governing party representation (-0.61).
As a proxy of the intensity of distributional conflicts we use two alternative
indicators: (i) the Gini coefficient of income distribution by households
(Londoño and Székely, 1997, based largely on Deininger and Squire, 1996),
and (ii) the change in the previous five-year period of the former indicator.
We are aware that none of the variables considered is a satisfactory indicator
of the concepts used in the theoretical literature.
D. Contagion
Although contagion usually refers to short-term effects and is tested on
high frequency data, here we use the term to assess how other countries’
policies influence the timing and speed of reforms on an annual basis. We use
two alternative explanatory variables. One is the difference between each
country’s policy index and the (simple) average policy index of the region.115 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
The other is the same difference, but computed with respect to a weighted
average of the policy indices of the other countries, where the weights are
each country’s share of bilateral trade in total trade with the other Latin
American countries (from unpublished IDB data). It is implied that we are
considering contagion only at a regional level.7
E. Bundling
For any given period, unbundling reaches a maximum when reform takes
place only in one area, and a minimum when it takes place in all areas in
equal amounts. A function that behaves in that way (within a range between








 i.e., the absolute value of the ratio between the
standard deviation of the changes of the individual indices of reform by area
and twice the average of those changes. To extend this measure of unbundling
to a multi-period sample, we obtain a weighted average of this function over
the (t) periods of observation, where the weights are the amounts of total
























We compute two versions of this index, one including the five areas of
reform for the whole sample period (1985-95), a second including the five
areas but restricting the periods to the two-year periods of maximum reform
in each country. Figure 1 shows the results for both versions.9 With the first
version, the degree of unbundling of the reforms undertaken between 1985
and 1995 goes from 0.5 in Argentina, Peru and Colombia, to between 0.8 and
0.9 in Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay and Bolivia. With the second version,
which refers only to the two-year period of maximum reform, the degree of
7 We report only regressions that use the second measure, but results are similar with the
first.
8 Provided there are no reform reversals. Indices greater than 1 may obtain when policy
changes in different areas take place in opposite directions.
9 The coefficients of correlation of the two measures is 0.19. There is a third measure of
bundling for the whole sample period, but excluding privatizations and labor legislation,116 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
unbundling goes from a minimum of 0.27 in the case of Argentina (1988-90)
to values above 0.8 in the cases of Mexico (1989-91), Colombia (1990-92),
Chile (1984-86) and Bolivia (1993-95).10
which we do not report here (it has correlations of 0.70 and 0.64 with the two measures
shown in Figure 1).
10 In the case of Bolivia the index of unbundling takes a value higher than 1, since policy
improvements were concentrated in one area (privatizations), while there was slippage in
another area (tax reform).
Figure 1. Degree of Unbundling of the Structural Reforms
between 1985 and 1995
5 areas, whole period 5 areas, two-year period of maximum reform
F. Trade Agreements
The only additional variable that is not self-explanatory is trade agreements,
which has been computed in the following way: in the year when a trade
agreement between country i and country j is signed, the variable for country
i takes the value of the ratio between total trade of country i with country j
and total external trade of country i. Trade agreement years were taken from
Latin Trade, June 1997, and trade values from IDB, unpublished data.
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V. Econometric Results
A summary of regression results appears in Tables 4 through 7. The
estimations are panel regressions for 19 countries and a sample period from
1985 to 1995. In general, we use annual data. However, since the original
data used for the construction of the trade index referred only to the years
1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1995, the regressions for trade reform are
restricted to these periods (henceforth bi-annual sample period). Since the
trade index is part of the total index, we have run the regressions for the latter
with both the annual and the bi-annual period samples. In all regressions the
dependent variable is the absolute change in the corresponding structural policy
index (thus losing the first observation for each country). The independent
variables include the lagged level of the structural policy index, which is
required by the fact that the indices are bounded variables (with values between
0 and 1). The corresponding coefficient (which, in most instances, will have
a negative sign) can be interpreted as the speed of (conditional) convergence
of structural policy among countries.
The method of estimation chosen in most regressions is fixed effects. In
some of the regressions, we prefer to report the FE estimations even though
the individual effects do not seem to be correlated to the explanatory variables
(see the Hausman tests reported at the bottom of Tables 4, 6 and 7). In those
cases, according to the Hausman test results, we might gain some efficiency
without losing consistency running RE estimations. However, we prefer to
report the FE estimations, because the Hausman test has relatively low power
in our regressions due to the few degrees of freedom. In other regressions, we
used the random effects methodology because some of the explanatory
variables are time invariant for each country (e.g., state efficiency) or show
most of their variation across countries (e.g., the number of effective parties
or the variable governing party representation) rather than across time. Finally,
time heterogeneity is also included in the estimation.
A. Crisis
Consistently, Table 4 shows that crisis appears as a significant explanatory































Table 4. Crisis as Determinants of Reforms
All reforms Trade Financial Tax Privatization Labor
Annual Bi-annual Bi-annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Lagged policy index  -0.473 -0.609 -0.500 -0.479 -0.390 -0.107 -0.135
(in level) (-5.78) *** (-4.19) *** (-4.16) *** (-6.29) *** (-5.59) *** (-1.64) (-2.58) **
Income per-capita gap 0.323 0.466 0.559 0.239 0.002 0.367 0.112
(maximum-observed) (3.84) *** (2.60) *** (2.15) ** (1.07) (0.03) (2.57) ** (2.28) **
GDP growth (in recession) 0.222 0.812 -0.790 0.767 0.491 0.455 0.123
(1.20) (1.95) * (-1.11) (1.31) (2.33) ** (1.44) (1.21)
Inflation (higher than 30%, 0,020
only), lagged (3.10) **
Inflation tax -0.001 0.013 0.020 -0.01 -0.009 0 0
(-0.39) (1.80) (1.67) * (1-.47) (-3.17) *** (-0.09) (-0.30)
Volatility of inflation, 0.123 0.261 0.203 0.372 -0.058 0.262
lagged (1.60) (1.64) (0.80) (1.47) (-0.43) (5.67)***
Fiscal Deficit -0.001 0.147 0.044 -0.153 -0.014 0.069 0.019





























Table 4. (Continued) Crisis as Determinants of Reforms
All reforms Trade Financial Tax Privatization Labor
Annual Bi-annual Bi-annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Hausman test c2 0.86 0.52 0.07 7.13 1.15 2.67 4.31
Probability > c2 1 1 1 0.90 1 0.99 0.99
Method of estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
R2 0.386 0.601 0.639 0.362 0.408 0.285 0.411
Number of observations 149 74 74 158 154 158 158
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. FE = Fixed effects.
Country and time dummies are included in each regression but not reported. More detailed regressions, with the effect of individual explanatory
variables, as well as that of alternative definitions of the crisis indicators, are available from the authors. Annual regressions are for the 1985-1995
































Table 5. Influence of Political Variables on Reforms
                                                             All reforms                 Trade        Financial           Tax          Privatization     Labor
                                                    Anual         Bi-annual      Bi-annual       Annual         Annual           Annual        Annual
Lagged policy index -0.175 -0.295 -0.456 -0.234 -0.207 0.092 0.017
(in level) (-3.32)*** (-2.75) *** (-5.42) *** (-4.01) *** (-4.44) *** (2.68) *** (1.27)
Constant 0.096 0.151 -0.072 0.157 0.095 -0.011 -0.006
(2.71)*** (2.62) *** (-0.36) (2.11) ** (3.05) *** (-0.46) (-0.45)
Income per-capita gap 0.053 0.088 0.781 0.101 0.004
(maximum observed) (1.80) * (1.52) (1.94) ** (3.05) *** (0.24)
Inflation (higher than 0.006
30%, only), lagged (0.99)
Inflation tax -0.006 -0.005
(-1.23) (-2.05) **
Volatility of inflation, 0.266
lagged (6.86) ***
Fiscal deficit (higher than 3%, 0.093
only) (1.70) *
Effective number of -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002





























Table 5. (Continued) Influence of Political Variables on Reforms
                                                             All reforms                 Trade        Financial           Tax          Privatization     Labor
                                                    Anual         Bi-annual      Bi-annual       Annual         Annual           Annual        Annual
Governing party -0.127 -0.017
representation (-1.58) (-1.23)
Second year of 0.016 0.014 0.048 0.054 0.027 0 0.004
presidential term (1.20) (0.52) (1.11) (1.39) (1.90)* (0.03) (0.78)
State efficiency 0.033 0.038 0.046 0.105 0.003 0.041 0.007
(1.12) (0.71) (0.53) (1.08) (0.11) (1.79) * (0.58)
Method of estimation RE RE RE RE RE RE RE
R2 0.233 0.486 0.550 0.151 0.321 0.285 0.329
Number of observations 121 53 62 120 116 150 150
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the  1% level. RE = Random effects.
More detailed regressions, with the effect of individual explanatory variables, as well as that of alternative definitions of the political variables, are

































Table 6. Influence of External Conditions on Reforms
                         All reforms Trade Financial Tax Privatization Labor
Annual Bi-annual Bi-annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Lagged policy index -0.501 -0.539 -0.536 -0.455 -0.309 -0.063 0.004
(in level) (-6.14) *** (-3.72) *** (-4.84) *** (-6.94) *** (-4.80) *** (-1.53) (0.29)
Income per-capita gap 0.307 0.383 0.582 0.136 0.022
(maximum observed) (3.84) *** (2.21) ** (2.44) ** (2.33) ** (1.07)
Inflation (higher than 30%, 0.007
only), lagged (1.21)
Inflation tax -0.011 0.007
(-1.92) * (1.08)
Volatility of inflation, 0.236
lagged (7.84) ***
Fiscal deficit (higher than 3%, 0.099
only) (1.76) *
Contagion -0.470 0.063 0.376 -0.660 -0.117 0.129 0.055
(-1.45) (0.10) (0.75) (-2.29) ** (-0.66) (1.13) (1.33)
Capital flows to 5,637 2,677 -1,15 13,714 -1,38 2,345





























Table 6. (Continued) Influence of External Conditions on Reforms
                         All reforms Trade Financial Tax Privatization Labor
Annual Bi-annual Bi-annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Capital flows by country, 0,062 -0,142 -0,217 0,316 0,027 0,161
lagged (0.68) (-0.78) (-0.87) (1.23) (0.22) (2.35) **
Financial index (change) 0,120
(1.78) *
Terms of trade change (%) 0,334
(0.57)
Hausman test c2 0.92 0.36 5.99 0.25 0.37 6.61 1.77
Probability  > c2 1 0.99 0.81 1 1 0.88 0.99
Method of estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
R2 0.359 0.511 0.581 0.361 0.262 0.254 0.318
Number of obs. 140 68 70 179 169 254 260
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. FE = Fixed effects.
Country dummies are included in each regression but not reported. Time dummies are also included except when the variable “capital flows to
Latin America” is included. More detailed regressions, with the effect of individual explanatory variables are available from the authors. Annual
regressions are for the 1985-1995 period, while bi-annual regressions are for 1986,1988,1990,1992,1994 and 1995.
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Table 7. Influence of Compensation Schemes on Reforms
Trade Financial Tax
Bi-annual Annual Annual
Lagged policy index (in level) -0.647 -0.527 -0.342
(-7.48) *** (-7.37) *** (-5.34) ***
Income per-capita gap 0.766
(maximum observed) (3.21) ***
Inflation (higher than 30%, 0.008
only), lagged (1.48)
Inflation tax -0.013 -0.006
(-1.74) * (-2.56) **
Real devaluation -0.405




of inflation, lagged, log) (-0.10)
Trade index (level) 0.053
(1.28)
Trade index (change) 0.119
(0.82)
Tax index (change) -0.123
(-0.58)
Hausman test c2 2.02 1.58 2.84
Probability > c2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Method of estimation FE FE FE
R2 0.682 0.370 0.350
Number of observations 91 164 168
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level. FE = Fixed effects. Country and time dummies are
included in each regression but not reported. More detailed regressions, with the effect of
individual explanatory variables are available from the authors. Annual regressions are for
the 1985-1995 period, while bi-annual regressions are for 1986,1988,1990,1992,1994 and
1995.
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best measure of crisis is the gap in income per capita (with respect to its
previous peak). The coefficient, which is robust to the inclusion of all other
explanatory variables, indicates that a gap of 10 percent in income per capita
leads to an annual increase in the total index of 0.032 (or a bi-annual increase
of 0.046). Although highly significant in statistical terms, this is a very small
effect indeed (remember that the average increase in the total index between
1985 and 1995 was 0.25). Additionally, large fiscal deficits sustained for
more than one year (in percent of GDP) also trigger the reforms: the variable
is significant for the bi-annual estimation. For trade reform the best measure
of crisis is also the gap in income per capita (with respect to its previous
peak). The effect is larger than for the total reform index: a gap of 10% in
income leads to a bi-annual increase in the trade index of around 0.06.
Additionally, the income gap also explains privatization and labor reforms,
with estimated effects of around 0.04 for the former and 0.01 for the latter.
Inflation crisis indicators have explanatory power for tax and labor reforms.
Financial reforms are associated with the inflation tax in a negative way: the
lower the inflation tax, the larger the changes in the reform index. Tax reforms
seem to be part of the aftermath of inflationary periods. When inflation is
higher than 30% there is a greater chance of improving tax policies: inflation
of 100% is associated with an (annual) improvement of 0.02 points of the tax
index. Although this is a very small effect, the level of inflation is not the
only reason why inflationary periods are good for tax reforms. Inflation tax
revenues are also associated with tax reforms. Labor reforms are also explained
by inflation-type indicators of crisis:  the higher the volatility of inflation, the
more likely labor reform will be achieved.
In synthesis, trade, privatization and labor reforms are clearly associated
with the income gap, while tax and labor reforms are associated with inflation
indicators of crisis. In the total index, which combines the five types of reforms,
the effect that prevails is that of income (and, to a lesser extent, growth).11
11 An alternative approach would be to create a composite index that summarizes all the
dimensions of crisis, using principal components methodology or another type of tools
(see, for instance, Lubotsky and Wittenberg, 2003). However, given the theoretical
background, in this paper we intended to identify how different types of crisis can affect
each area of reform.126 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
12 The only exception occurs for the labor market index, when the individual effect of these
variables is considered: a lower number of effective parties eases the reform, as theoretically
expected; on the other hand, lower governing party representation facilitates the reform,
contradicting the theoretical prediction. Note that given that these two variables are measures
of fragmentation and are highly correlated, in the regression that include all the political
variables the number of effective parties and the seats of government’s party were not
included together. Just the one with higher explanatory power by itself was used.
13 Although not reported in the tables, first, and third years of presidential terms were also
used as independent variables with similar results.
The causality tests reported in the Appendix (Table A.2) show that, although
causality runs both ways, the causality from alternative measures of growth
and income to reform is much stronger than causality from reform to these
same variables (obviously, with opposite signs, since falls in income cause
increases in the policy index, while these increases accelerate income). There
is also a similar two-way causality between inflation and reform, but not
between fiscal deficits and reform.
B. Political Variables
The timing and composition of reforms do not appear to be strongly
influenced by the political variables highlighted in the theoretical literature
(see Table 5). Neither the number of effective parties, nor governing party
representation, which are measures of political fragmentation, has explanatory
power in the regressions.12 Although less discussed in the literature, changes
of government may be more important than the previous political variables:
for tax reform, the index increases three percentage points in the second year
of a presidential term.13 Finally, there is some support for the claims that
more efficient state apparatus eases the reform in the case of privatizations.
C. Contagion and Capital Flows
Although these two channels of influence are strongly correlated, our
estimates give some support to the hypothesis that capital flows to Latin
America (as opposed to country-specific capital flows) have been an engine127 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
for privatization, even after controlling for other type of missing time effects.
Our estimates in Table 6 give some support to the hypothesis that capital
flows to Latin America and country-specific capital flows (both of which are
strongly correlated) have been an engine for privatization, even after
controlling for other type of missing time effects. An increase of capital flows
by 1% of the region’s GDP appears to be associated with an improvement of
around 2% in the privatization index of each country. Interestingly, (lagged)
country-specific capital flows do not show a significant influence on reforms,
except in the case of privatizations. The causality tests reported in the Appendix
suggest, however, that when an appropriate number of lags are considered,
the reforms have caused capital flows to the region (although, surprisingly,
not to the individual countries).
D. Compensation
The evidence in Table 7 on the importance of compensating the opponents
of reform is somewhat mixed. If anything, real devaluations retard rather
than facilitate trade reforms. The prospect of trade pacts does not have any
significant influence on the timing of trade reforms, nor do tax or trade reforms
have any influence on financial reforms.
E. Exogenous Changes
The convergence term (lagged policy index) in Table 4 through 7 is highly
significant (except for some cases of the privatization and labor indices) and
presents large coefficients in some instances (especially in the regressions for
the total and the trade and financial indices).
Although extremely scanty, this evidence favors the hypothesis according
to which those areas of reform where the distributional conflicts are more
subject to political debate are adopted later. In a more robust way, however, it
also implies that, after controlling for the main factors suggested by theory, a
large proportion of the changes observed in the structural policies are either
trends towards convergence, or simply country-specific unexplained variations128 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
(captured by the fixed effects). The low R-squared values of the regressions
point  in  the  same  direction.  Only  in  the  case  of  trade  reforms  do  we  get
R-squared values around 0.6; in the rest of the fixed effect estimations they
are usually below 0.4 in spite of the inclusion of both year and country
dummies. In other words, although we do find evidence to support some of
the hypotheses put forward by the theoretical literature on the political
economy of reform, only a small fraction of the timing and speed of the reforms
undertaken in Latin America in the last decade is explained by them.
F. Bundling
The regressions that attempt to explain the degree of bundling of reforms
are reported in Table 8. Unlike the previous regressions, these are cross-section
regressions, as the time dimension of the reforms is embedded in the alternative
measures of bundling. We have been unable to find any evidence in support
of the hypotheses that either the distributional conflicts or the political variables
influence the degree of bundling of the reforms. In the regressions that use
the second version of unbundling, i.e., those for the two-year period of
maximum reform, the initial level of the total policy index is consistently
significant, while the rest of explanatory variables are not.14 This suggests
that the degree of bundling (during a relatively short period) is influenced not
so much by political or distributional variables as by the status of the structural
policies. Thus, the conclusions of the previous paragraph apply equally well
to the question of bundling. We must stress, however, that our indicators of
distributional conflict are extremely rudimentary and do not do justice to the
theoretical models, and that the degrees of freedom in this last set of regressions
are rather small.
14 The initial level of the policy index is not significant in the definition of bundling which




























Table 8. Bundling in Cross Section of Countries
Variables Full period Change in two years of maximum reform
Constant 0.365 0.75 0.914 0.62 -0.464 -0.0493 -0.213 -0.341
(0.54) (7.06) *** (4.34) *** (4.35) *** (-0.89) (-0.10) (-0.58) (-0.86)
Initial index of reform 2.017 1.392 1.785 1.81
(3.29) *** (1.56) (2.73) ** (2.73) **
GINI85 0.008 0.002
(0.60) (0.27)
Change in GINI 1985-1989 -0.014 -0.001
(-0.52) (-0.07)
Governing party -0.304 -0.142
representation (-0.72) (-0.44)
Effective number of parties 0.045 0.014
(1.14) (0.44)
Method of estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.42 0.04 0.23 0.23
Number of observations 13 11 19 19 13 11 19 19
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.130 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
VI. Conclusion
The theories on the political economy of reform have put forward an array
of hypotheses that are, at least partially, subject to empirical scrutiny. We
have found very strong support for the well-known hypothesis that crises
make reform viable. More specifically, we have found that crises that are
characterized by falls in real incomes and by negative rates of growth facilitate
the adoption of trade reforms (and maybe labor reforms), while inflationary
crises tend to be associated with financial reforms. Nothing can be said on
the influence of fiscal crises, or on the type of crises that could prompt the
adoption of tax reforms or the advance of privatization programs.
We have also found support for the (less theoretically sound) hypothesis
that reforms (especially fiscal ones) are more likely at the beginning of
government periods. None of the other hypotheses on the role of political and
distributional variables, the importance of compensation schemes or contagion,
finds support in our results. At most, there is some evidence suggesting that
tax reforms are more likely in countries with open trade regimes and, perhaps,
that reforms where the distributional costs are subject to political debate tend
to be adopted later. But, rather disappointingly, most of the important reforms
that have turned around the structural policies of Latin America seem to have
responded to a process of convergence.
Appendix
Table A.1. Data Sources
Variable                                      Source
Bundling indices Computed with indices of structural policy (Lora,1997),
using definitions in text.
Capital flows Data from the Economic and Social Data Base (ESDB)
of the IDB, based on IMF.
Contagion Computed using definition in text, with structural policy
indices (Lora, 1997) and trade values furnished by IDB
(unpublished data).
Effective number Defined as 1/E Sj², where Sj is the proportion of131 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
representatives that party j has in the lower/single house,
taken from IDB (1997), Part 3.
Fiscal deficits ESDB, based on IMF and national data. See IBD (1997),
Part 4.
GDP growth ESDB, based on national data.
Gini coefficients Londoño and Székely (1997), based largely on Deininger
and Squire (1996).
Governing party The percentage of legislative seats held by the head of
government’s party in the lower/single house, computed
with data from IPU (1985 to 1996).
Index of structural Lora (1997), reported also in IDB (1997), Part 2.
policies
Inflation Defined as Log(1+B), where B is average inflation (from
monthly data) based on ESDB.
Inflation tax Defined as Log(1+B ) * M1/GDP, where B is average
inflation (from monthly data) and M1/GDP is the standard
liquidity ratio computed by ESDB.
Per capita Log difference between real income per capita of the
previous year and the highest value of this same variable
observed between 1970 and that year. Based on ESDB.
Real devaluation Change in the real exchange rate index computed by
ESDB (1990 = 100) using a trade-weighted basket of
currencies for each country.
State efficiency Simple average of indices, on a scale from 0 to 1, which
measure corruption, bureaucratic procedures and
efficiency of the judiciary, taken from Mauro (1995).
Terms of trade Change in indices of terms of trade (1990 = 100) by
ESDB, based mainly on ECLAC.
Trade pacts The pacts and their years of subscription come from Latin
Trade, June 1997.
Volatility of Average of  variance of monthly inflation rates, computed
from IMF electronic database.
Table A.1. (Continued) Data Sources
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Table A.2. Granger Causality Test between Macrovariables and
Structural Reforms (2 Lags)
                                  Macrovariables to reform   Reform to macrovariables
Coefficient Sign. level Coefficient Sign. level
GDP Growth
and level of index -0.33971 0.11% 0.06730 2.42%
and change of index -0.37979 0.07% 0.11822 54.42%
GDP gap with respect
to long term trend1
and level of index 0.60917 0.07% -0.05150 0.13%
and change of index 0.77387 0.01% -0.02582 72.31%
Income per-cap. gap2
and level of index 0.04945 0.22% -0.03317 24.41%
and change of index 0.05254 0.21% 0.05911 79.38%
Inflation (log)
and level of index 0.01104 3.95% -1.11025 0.46%
and change of index 0.01780 0.07% -2.74820 18.82%
Inflation3
and level of index 0.01048 4.20% -1.11134 0.84%
and change of index 0.01681 0.08% -2.89183 18.48%
Fiscal deficit
and level of index 0.00237 78.23% 0.01464 54.42%
and change of index -0.15101 49.39% -0.00971 85.90%
Fiscal deficit4
and level of index -0.04368 74.17% 0.02123 38.80%
and change of index -0.20076 25.92% 0.05450 58.52%
Capital flows to
Latin America
and level of index 0.06055 46.31% 0.03759 0.08%
and change of index -0.39250 7.32% 0.03690 45.96%
Capital flows to country
and level of index -0.01042 8.11% -0.03594 32.54%
and change of index -0.05668 3.34% 0.08777 38.01%
Notes: 1 Trend-observed when positive. 2 Maximum-observed. 3 Higher than 30%. 4 Higher
than 3%133 WHAT MAKES REFORMS LIKELY
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